New Bridge Street update:
Executive remuneration areas of focus for the New Year
January 2019
2019 marks the start of a new chapter in the executive pay landscape as listed companies seek to comply with the new UK Corporate Governance Code, take into account the latest policy guidance from the investment community and adhere to the ever expanding disclosure requirements for Directors' pay.
Last year heralded a period of change in UK governance. Following calls from the Government to tackle perceived short-termism and a number of high-profile scandals, proposals were published to improve companies' accountability for executive pay decisions. The remuneration reporting regulations and the Corporate Governance Code were both revised and updated investor voting guidelines (issued towards the end of the year) reinforced the statutory and regulatory changes. Together, these will require companies to make substantial changes to their remuneration reporting and practices from 2019.
The timeline leading to these changes is as follows:
Our Insight Zone includes previous briefings on the above developments and access to our 2018 Reports on FTSE Directors' Remuneration.
Key changes arising from the new guidance include:
Principles-driven remuneration policies: companies will be required to demonstrate how their remuneration policies address six principles set out in Provision 40 of the new UK Corporate Governance Code (Code): clarity, simplicity, risk, predictability, proportionality and alignment to the culture of the company.
Post-employment shareholding guidelines:
the general requirement for executives is 200% of salary and to be compliant with the new Code, Remuneration Committees will need a formal policy on post-employment shareholdings, covering both vested and unvested shares. Companies need to review share ownership requirements and plan documentation to establish appropriate arrangements for monitoring and enforcement.
Discretion:
the use of discretion to moderate quantum is flagged by both regulators and investor bodies. Policies and plan rules should be reviewed to ensure that they allow discretion for Remuneration Committees to override formulaic outcomes. Whilst many annual bonus schemes already address this, LTI plan rules typically do not and will need updating.
Malus and clawback provisions:
companies are encouraged to develop smarter clawback triggers and assess enforceability. The FRC Guidance on Board Effectiveness suggests that serious reputational damage and corporate failure might be included alongside the usual triggers of erroneous or misleading data, misstatement of accounts and individual misconduct. In addition, the Investment Association expect the triggers to be clearly disclosed and reinforce the need for companies to have appropriate documentation in place to ensure enforceability. We expect companies will require executives to sign forms of acceptance, confirming they understand the plan terms. It is also important to ensure that the remuneration policy, plan rules, any associated award
documentation and employee contracts (where relevant) are consistent and do not contradict the malus and clawback provisions.
Additional reporting: the new regulations require reporting of CEO pay ratios and the impact of share price movements on LTI awards granted to executives. These are only compulsory for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2019, but early adoption is encouraged.
Expanding the remit of the Remuneration Committee:
Committees should, under the new Code, have direct responsibility for setting remuneration for all senior management, including the Company Secretary. It also reinforces the expectation that workforce remuneration and related policies, and the alignment of incentives and rewards with culture, should be taken into account when setting the policy for executive director remuneration and, further, that companies should engage with the workforce to explain how this has been taken into account.
The Wates Corporate Governance Principles for Large Private Companies
The Wates Corporate Governance Principles were published in December 2018. They cover private companies in the UK which satisfy either or both of the following:
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more than 2,000 employees;
- a turnover of more than £200 million and a balance sheet of more than £2 billion.
Like the new Code, they apply to corporate reporting for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2019.
The Principles recognise the variety of large private UK companies. Differing management and ownership structures mean that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to corporate governance is not appropriate. Companies should therefore follow the Principles using an ‘apply and explain’ approach, applying each Principle within the context of the company’s specific circumstances and explaining in their own words how they have been addressed.
The Principles specify that boards should promote clear and transparent remuneration structures aligned to long-term sustainable performance, behaviours and achievement of company purpose, values and strategy. In setting director and senior manager remuneration, consideration should be given to remuneration throughout the organisation to reinforce a sense of shared purpose. Companies may wish to establish a remuneration committee to take responsibility for designing remuneration policies and structures.
As with the new Code, the importance of stakeholder engagement is emphasised throughout the Principles. Companies are encouraged to outline the methods of engagement used with the workforce and other stakeholders and demonstrate how boards have considered the issues raised.
Next steps
The changes discussed in this briefing create challenges for Remuneration Committees.
We can assist with every aspect of preparing for the changes, from supporting Remuneration Committees in deciding how to address the changes through to technical drafting and stakeholder communication.
If you require further information or would like to discuss issues raised in this briefing note please contact your usual representative or click here.
To aid Remuneration Committee planning for 2019, we have included a checklist of the key changes below.
Remuneration Committee planning checklist
Remuneration Committee Terms of Reference and practices We recommend that companies review the terms of reference for their Remuneration Committees to ensure that they are compliant with the new Code:
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Extended RemCo Remit
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Code: Remuneration Committees should set the pay for all senior management (i.e. first layer of management below board, including Company Secretary).
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Workforce comparison
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Code/IA: Remuneration Committees should consider remuneration policies of the broader workforce when setting the policy for executive director remuneration.
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Formal process for engaging with employees
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Code: The board should establish a formal process for employee engagement. The Remuneration Committee should disclose in the annual report what engagement with the workforce has taken place to explain how executive remuneration aligns with wider company pay policy.
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Remuneration Committee Chairman
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Code: The Committee Chair should have at least 12 months' prior experience on a Remuneration Committee. Note: the IA position is stricter, requiring 12 months' prior experience on the Company’s Remuneration Committee.
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Board/Committee composition
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Code: Company Chairs should not remain in post beyond nine years (including time served as NED prior to appointment as Chair). Tenure may be extended in limited circumstances, namely: succession planning or diversity. Smaller companies are no longer exempt from ensuring at least half of their board (excluding the Chair) comprises of independent NEDs.
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Remuneration policies
A review of remuneration policies and practices may be required to ensure compliance with the new Code and the shareholders' expectations:
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Remuneration philosophy
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Code: Remuneration policies and structures should clearly demonstrate the link between strategy, culture and remuneration. In the annual report, a description (including examples) should show how the Committee has addressed Provision 40 (remuneration policy to address: clarity, simplicity, risk, predictability, proportionality and alignment to culture).
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Increased emphasis on discretion
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Code: Remuneration policies (and plan documentation) should be sufficiently flexible to override formulaic outcomes.
Code/IA: RemCo Chairs should disclose any instances where discretion is exercised or state no discretion has been used in the year being reported.
LGIM: Goes further and recommends that Remuneration Committees should have the discretion to reduce an award if it reaches a value beyond Committee expectations and full payment could result in reputational damage.
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Pensions
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Code: Encourages alignment of executive and workforce pension contributions. The IA states that rates for existing directors should be reduced as soon as possible and without compensation and LGIM will vote against policies from 2020 where there are no changes to address pension disparity.
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Bonus: quantum
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LGIM: Advocates reducing bonus levels (a bonus of 200% should be reserved for the largest companies) and ISS specifies that target bonuses should typically be no more than 50% of the maximum opportunity. Pay-out above this level for target performance should be supported by a sufficiently robust explanation.
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Bonus: deferral
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IA: Where bonus opportunity is greater than 100% of salary, a proportion should be deferred in shares.
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LTI: structures
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IA/LGIM: Use of restricted share plans (i.e. without performance conditions) will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, considering the context, strategic rationale and company's previous approach to remuneration.
Code/IA/ISS: LTIs must be subject to combined vesting and holding periods of at least five years.
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LTI: grant levels
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ISS/LGIM: Where there has been a material decline in the share price, Remuneration Committees should consider reducing the LTI at grant.
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Other: dividend equivalents
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IA: Dividend equivalents accrued on deferred bonuses or vested shares should be paid in shares (not cash).
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Other: clawback and malus
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Code/IA/LGIM: RemCo might wish to establish a more substantial list of circumstances in which malus & clawback may apply, beyond misconduct and misstatement of results, and consider how this may be enforced.
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Strengthening of shareholding requirements
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IA: The period for achieving the minimum level of shareholding and the consequences of not achieving this should be specified. Unvested shares, (not subject to performance conditions), may be counted net of tax.
LGIM: The shareholding requirement should be linked to the value of total variable pay and directors should be encouraged to buy shares to meet it.
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Formal post-employment Shareholding requirements
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Code/ISS: A formal policy for post-employment shareholding requirements should be developed. The IA recommend a post-cessation shareholding period of at least two years (applying to the lower of the shareholding requirement or actual holding on departure), for both new and existing executive directors. This should be established at the earliest opportunity, or at the company’s next policy vote as a backstop. LGIM recommends that shares are held for two years (and for FTSE 100 companies this should be no less than 3x salary).
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Treatment of leavers
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IA: Both deferred bonus and LTI awards should continue to be settled in shares and subject to the appropriate performance and holding periods. On retirement, mitigation should apply if the individual moves to another role.
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Buyout awards
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LGIM: Buy-out awards should only be made in exceptional circumstances and mainly be over shares.
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CEO pay ratio for quoted companies with 250+ full- time UK employees
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Legislation: Annual requirement to publish the pay ratio between the CEO and the UK workforce and to justify the differential. The IA encourages companies to publish results in 2019, even if not required until 2020.
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Share price appreciation on incentive outcomes
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Legislation/GC100: Notes to the single figure table companies must disclose the amount of any LTI award which is attributable to an increase in share price and whether share price movement (up or down) has resulted in the use of discretion. The remuneration policy must illustrate the maximum remuneration of directors assuming share price growth of 50% over the performance period, for LTIs.
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Company response to a >20% vote against
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Code: When 20% or more of votes are cast against a resolution, the company should explain, when announcing voting results, how it intends to consult shareholders to understand the reasons behind the result. An update on the shareholders' views and actions taken should be published within six months after the shareholder meeting. The board should then provide a final summary in the annual report and, if applicable, in the explanatory notes to resolutions at the next shareholder meeting, on what impact the feedback has had on the decisions the board has taken and any actions or resolutions now proposed.
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Voting against individual directors
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IA: Will continue to vote against directors on re-election where they feel that the Committee’s decisions have failed to meet investor expectations.
ISS: Will consider voting against a director’s re-election due to egregious actions relating to the director’s service on other boards.
LGIM: Will vote against the election of directors after two consecutive years of a ‘no’ vote on pay.
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